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INTRODUCTION

Imagine you inherit a 2000-acre property containing old-growth
hardwoods, pine flatwoods, marshes, wetlands, and wildlife. Your
grandfather acquired the property in the early 1950s and managed it his
* "When fire breaks out and catches in thorns so that the stacked grain or the standing
grain or the field is consumed, the one who started the fire shall make full restitution." Exodus
22:6 (New Revised Standard Version) (emphasis added).
See Madison v. Midyette, 541 So. 2d 1315, 1318 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (concluding as
**
a matter of law that the clearing of land by fire is an inherently dangerous activity).
Shareholder, Hopping Green & Sams, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; University of Florida,
***
J.D., cum laude, 2003; University of Florida, M.A.U.R.P., 2003; University of South Florida, B.A.
(English), summa cum laude, 2000.
****
Shareholder, Hopping Green & Sams, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; University of South
Carolina, J.D., 1999; Clemson University, B.S. (Aquaculture, Fisheries and Wildlife Biology),
1995.
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entire life so that you and your children could enjoy it. One day, you
notice your neighbor-who owns an adjacent property very similar to
yours-burning his property during a predictably dry time of year. Weeks
go by. Judging from the plumes of smoke emanating from your
neighbor's property, the fire continues to smolder. You start to get
nervous. Are properly-managed prescribed burns supposed to smolder for
six weeks? Your friends tell you that so far your neighbor's prescribed
burn has caused two wildfires and smoked out the adjacent highway
twice; this does not inspire confidence. More smoldering. Then the
inevitable happens-the supposedly "controlled" prescribed burn jumps
the creek and destroys about 800 acres of your 2000-acre family tree
farm. When you are finally able to confront your neighbor about the
damages, he responds by shrugging his shoulders and giving you a copy
of the state's certified prescribed burning statute. "Prescribed burning is
a good thing," he says. "Your loss, unless you can prove I was grossly
negligent."
Much has been made about the benefits of prescribed burning.' While
acknowledging these benefits, this Article focuses on the recent
experience of two brothers in Franklin County, Florida, J. Gordon Shuler
and T. Michael Shuler, who were subjected to almost six years of
obstruction, delay, and litigation against two state agencies for a
prescribed burn gone very wrong. We intend to shed some light on how
the State of Florida's prescribed burn statute, Section 590.125, Florida
Statutes,2 was construed in this case and subsequently amended to further
insulate prescribed burners from liability.
THE PRESCRIBED BuRN

The Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund of the
State of Florida (Board of Trustees) is the owner of an approximately
3267-acre property located within Tate's Hell State Forest in Franklin
County, Florida (the "Prescribed Burn Area").3 Pursuant to Chapter 590,
Florida Statutes, the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services,
Division of Forestry (Forestry)4 is responsible for managing Tate's Hell
1. See FLA. STAT. § 590.125(3)(a) (2007); Initial Brief for Defendant-Appellant, at
1-3,
Fla. Dep't of Agric. and Consumer Serv. v. Shuler Ltd. P'ship, 139 So. 3d 914 (Fla. 1st DCA
2014) (No. 1D13-0592) [hereinafter Initial Brief]. See also Stephen McCullers, Note, A

Dangerous Servant and a Fearful Master: Why Florida'sPrescribedFire Statute Should be
Amended, 65 FLA. L. REv. 587, 591-602 (2013).

2. FLA. STAT.

§ 590.125 (2007). All statutory citations are to the 2007 version of the

FloridaStatutes unless otherwise indicated.

3. Pretrial Statement, at 963, Shuler Ltd. P'ship v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. and Consumer
Serv., No. 2011-66-CA (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 2012) [hereinafter Pretrial Statement].
4. Effective September 2011, Forestry reverted to its old name: the "Florida Forest

"WHEN FIRE BREAKS OUT"

2015]1

55

State Forest, including the Prescribed Bum Area, for the Board of
Trustees. 5 Shuler Limited Partnership (Shuler) is the owner of an
approximately 2182-acre property located just west of the Prescribed
Burn Area (Shuler's Pasture), which is separated from the Prescribed
Burn Area by only Cash Creek. 6
On April 9, 2008, on behalf of the Board of Trustees, Forestry and its
employees commenced a prescribed burn officially known as (19) High
Bluff 37 (the Prescribed Burn) in Tate's Hell State Forest within the
Prescribed Burn Area.7 The Prescribed Burn caused three wildfires over
a period of approximately 45 days: on April 21, 2008, it caused a (vildfire
officially known as (19) High Bluff Fire; on May 6, 2008, it caused a

wildfire officially known as (19) High Bluff 2 Fire; and on May 13, 2008,
it caused a wildfire on Shuler's Pasture officially known as (19) Pasture
Fire.8 It also twice smoked over U.S. Highway 98 requiring closure of the
road, endangering motorists.9 The Prescribed Burn was not finally
extinguished until May 23, 2008.10
JURY TRIAL

After attempting to resolve the matter amicably, Shuler gave the
required statutory notice" and on February 28, 2011 filed a lawsuit for
2
damages against Forestry and the Board of Trustees.1 Shuler's complaint
3
alleged that Forestry's' decision to ignite and method of conducting the
Prescribed Burn was negligent (Count I); violated Section 590.13, Florida
Statutes (Count II); was negligent per se (Count III); and/or was grossly
negligent (Count IV).14 Shuler further alleged that Forestry's statutory

&

Service." See The Department ofAgriculture and Consumer Services' Division ofForestry Now
Bears Its OriginalName: Florida Forest Service, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
20
11http://www.freshfromflorida.com/News-Events/Press-Releases/
CONSUMER SERVICES,

Press-Releases/The-Department-of-Agriculture-and-Consumer-Services-Division-of-ForestryNow-Bears-Its-original-Name-Florida-Forest-Service (last accessed on May 19, 2014).
5.

Pretrial Statement, supra note 3, at 964.

6. Id.
7. Id.; Answer Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee Shuler Ltd. P'ship, App. B, 1, Shuler, 139 So.
3d 914 (No. 1D13-0592) [hereinafter Answer Brief].
8. Pretrial Statement; supra note 3, at 964-65; Answer Brief, supra note 7, Apps. C-E.
9. See Answer Brief, supra note 7, App. B, 16, 23; Trial Transcript, at 378-79, 382-84,
286-87, Shuler, No. 2011-66-CA (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 2012) [hereinafter Transcript].
10.

Pretrial Statement, supra note 3, at 965.

11.
12.

See FLA. STAT. § 768.28(6)(a) (2007).
Complaint at 3, 19, Shuler, No. 2011-66-CA (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 2012).

13.

Unless otherwise noted, all references to Forestry herein should be construed to also

include the Board of Trustees.
14. Joint Motion for Leave to File Amended Pleadings at 989-1002, Shuler, No. 2011-66CA (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 2012). The complaint originally included a count for strict liability, but this
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violations and negligent acts in conducting the Prescribed Burn caused
the Pasture Fire, which damaged or destroyed 835 acres of Shuler's
timber and resulted in other damages to Shuler.'"
Shuler presented six witnesses at trial. First, Mr. T. Michael Shuler
and Mr. J. Gordon Shuler, the partnership's managing partners, each
testified about the history of Shuler's Pasture, the Pasture Fire and the
damages it caused them, and their interactions with Forestry's personnel
during and after the Pasture Fire.1 6 Second, Mr. Michael Dooner of
Southern Forestry Consultants, Inc., who was tendered and accepted as
an expert in timber damage appraisals, testified that based upon his postwildfire assessments Shuler had suffered approximately $834,018 in
unmitigated damages due to the Pasture Fire.' 7 Third, Mr. Ray Home of
Forestland Management, Inc., who was tendered and accepted as an
expert in certified prescribed burning, testified that in his opinion
Forestry's conduct of the Prescribed Bum presented a clear and present
danger to the lives and property of adjacent property owners, motorists
on the highway, and Forestry's own personnel.' 8
Shuler also presented the testimony of Forestry personnel. Mr. Victor
Rowland, Mr. Joseph Taranto's immediate supervisor at Forestry,
admitted that he issued Mr. Taranto, the certified prescribed burn
manager (CPBM) responsible for the Prescribed Bum, a Notice of
Violation (NOV) because his actions relating to the Prescribed Burn
violated Section 590.125, Florida Statutes.' The NOV, which was
admitted into evidence, revealed three independent violations of Section
590.125, Florida Statutes: failure to provide adequate firebreaks at the
burn site and sufficient personnel and firefighting equipment for control
of the Prescribed Bum; failure to limit the duration of the Prescribed Bum
to the two-day time period authorized in the written prescription; and
failure to keep the Prescribed Bum within the predetermined area
identified in the written prescription. 20 Additionally, Mr. James Karels,
Director of Forestry, admitted that Forestry was Board of Trustees' agent
for purposes of managing and conducting prescribed burns in Tate's Hell
State Forest'21

Forestry's answers admitted and denied various allegations, and
raised all of the following defenses: Shuler's Count I (negligence) was
count was dismissed and the complaint subsequently amended to include the count in gross
negligence.
15. Id. at 989, 991, 994, 998, 1001.
16. Transcript, supra note 9, at 98-151, 218-23, 224-36.
17. Id. at 242-93, 327-36.
18. See id. at 355-404, 500-07.
19. Id at 510-26, 536-40; Answer Brief, supra note 7, App. F.
20. Transcript, supra note 9, at 513-21; Answer Brief, supra note 7, App. F.
21. Transcript, supra note 9, at 541-43, 595-97.
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not actionable at law; the NOV issued to Mr. Taranto was, as a matter of
law, improperly issued and therefore properly rescinded; no agency
relationship existed between Forestry and the Board of Trustees, and
therefore the Board of Trustees could not be held vicariously liable for
Forestry's actions; Shuler's claims were governed by sovereign
22
immunity; and Shuler failed to mitigate its damages.
Forestry presented a total of 18 witnesses at trial. In addition to also
presenting testimony from Mr. Rowland, Mr. Karels, and Mr. Taranto
(via video deposition) in their case-in-chief, Forestry solicited fact
testimony regarding its conduct of the Prescribed Burn from 11 other
Forestry employees, including Mr. Kenneth Weber, manager of the
23
Additionally, Forestry
Tallahassee Forestry Center Field Unit.
general counsel at
deputy
Costigan,
John
Mr.
of
testimony
presented the
who testified
Services,
Consumer
and
the Department of Agriculture
burn statute
prescribed
regarding his legal interpretations of the certified
24
and the propriety of the NOV issued to Mr. Taranto; Mr. Leonard
Wood, who was tendered and accepted as an expert in forestry and timber
land appraisals, and questioned the methodology used in Shuler's timber
damage appraisal; 2 5 and Mr. Joseph Ferguson, who was tendered and
accepted as an expert in certified prescribed burning and testified that
26
Forestry's conduct of the Prescribed Burn was not negligent. Finally,
the Board of Trustees presented the testimony of Ms. Marianne
Gengenbach, coordinator of land management programs at the Division
of State Lands, who testified that the Board of Trustees does not consider
27
Forestry to be its agent for land management purposes.
On November 1, 2012, after a seven-day trial receiving, reviewing
and weighing all of the evidence, the jury entered a verdict in favor of
Shuler on all four counts of the complaint and awarded Shuler
$741,496.00 in damages. 28 Forestry and the Board of Trustees appealed
29
the jury verdict to the First District Court of Appeal.

22. Answer and Defenses to Second Amended Complaint, at 1-7, Shuler, No. 2011-66CA (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 2012).
23. The other ten witnesses were Mr. Sean Luchs (Forestry meteorologist), Mr. Travis
Bentley (Forestry ranger), Mr. Christopher Crosby (Forestry ranger), Mr. Michael Newell
(Forestry ranger), Ms. Opal Fulton (Forestry ranger), Mr. Calvin Setterich (Forestry pilot), Ms.
Odessa Conley (Forestry clerk/tower person), Mr. Richard Smith (Forestry ranger), Mr. Bryce

Thomas (Forestry supervisor), and Mr. James Shiver (Forestry firefighter). See Transcript,supra
note 9, at 614-25; 691-1408.
24. See id at 654-91.
25. See id at 1430-1566.
26. See id at 1570-1675.
27. See id at 1408-29.
28. Final Judgment, at 1351-52, Shuler, No. 2011-66-CA (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 2012).
29. Shuler, 139 So. 3d at 915.
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APPEAL

Forestry alleged all of the following assignments of error on appeal
(among others): the jury verdict on gross negligence was not supported
by competent substantial evidence;"o the trial court improperly construed
Chapter 590, Florida Statutes; 3 1the trial court improperly received certain
evidence regarding damages to Shuler's Pasture; 32 the trial court
improperly denied Forestry and the Board of Trustees' motion to amend
its answers regarding the date when the Prescribed Bum was
"extinguished;" 3 and the trial court improperly
denied the Board of
Trustees' motion to dismiss it as a party to the case.3 4
On May 12, 2014, over a year after Forestry took its appeal to the
First District Court of Appeal, the Court resolved the case on narrow
grounds. In a one-page per curiam opinion, Judges Philip Padovano and
Simone Marstiller affirmed the jury verdict. 35 Judges Padovano and
Marstiller explained:

PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a judgment based on a jury verdict. The
Division of Forestry conducted a controlled bumof state property
in Franklin County but before the fire was completely extinguished
an ember from the smoldering fire drifted onto the [Shuler's]
property destroying 835 acres of trees. The jury based its verdict
for [Shuler] on negligence, negligence per se, gross negligence and
a violation of section 590.13, Florida Statutes.
One of the arguments on appeal is that the evidence was
insufficient to support the jury's finding of gross negligence. We
conclude that a jury could reasonably find the appellants [Forestry
and the Board of Trustees] were grossly negligent, based on expert
testimony and other evidence presented by the appellees at trial.
Whether negligence is ordinary or gross is a question to be
resolved by the jury. See Courtney v. Florida Transformer, Inc.,

549 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). If there is some evidence

from which a jury could make a finding of gross negligence, and
in this case there is, the appellate court must affirm. Our resolution
of this issue makes it unnecessary to consider the other principal
arguments for reversal discussed in the dissent.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Initial Brief, supra note 1, at 18.
See id. at 22-36.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 46.
Shuler, 139 So. 3d at 915.
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For these reasons, we conclude that the appellants have failed to
demonstrate the existence of reversible error.
Affirmed.3 6
Forestry had argued that there was no competent substantial evidence
upon which the jury could have based a finding of gross negligence at
trial." Shuler responded that the jury was entitled to resolve whether
Forestry's conduct of the Prescribed Burn rose to the level of gross
negligence and, based upon considerable competent substantial evidence
presented at trial, the jury properly resolved that question in favor of
Shuler.3 8 Moreover, the Court could not reweigh the evidence on
appeal. 39 Ultimately, Shuler prevailed on this key issue and, as noted by
the Court, it was therefore "unnecessary to consider the other principal
40
arguments for reversal discussed in the dissent."
DISSENT

Although the Court may have deemed it unnecessary to address "the
other principal arguments for reversal discussed in the dissent," the reader
may find them interesting. Judge Scott Makar's dissenting opinion
4
spanned approximately 30 pages. 1 The first 11 pages of the opinion
described the history of and purpose for the certified prescribed burning
statute, Tate's Hell State Forest and Shuler's Pasture, Forestry's conduct
of the Prescribed Burn and its subsequent "mopping up" of the Prescribed
Burn Area, the three wildfires caused by the Prescribed Burn, including
42
the Pasture Fire, and the procedural posture of the case.
The remainder of the dissent focused on "the cumulative effect of
three statutory interpretation errors[,]" which Judge Makar concluded
"resulted in [Forestry] being denied a fair opportunity to defend itself
under the correct legal standards, thereby warranting reversal and a new
trial."4 3 Specifically, Judge Makar sympathized with Forestry's
arguments-that the trial court misinterpreted the certified prescribed
burning statute to allow claims other than gross negligence, should not
have disallowed Forestry from using the statutory definition of
"extinguished" in its defense, and should not have precluded Forestry
36. Id.
37. Initial Brief, supra note 1, at 18.
38. See Answer Brief, supra note 7, at 6-13.
39. Id. at 13.
40. Shuler, 139 So. 3d at 915.
41. Id. at 915-28 (Makar, J. dissenting).
42. Id at 915-20 (Makar, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 928 (Makar, J., dissenting).
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from arguing that CPBMs were not legally required to be onsite beyond
the initial burn period."
With respect to the first issue-whether the trial court misinterpreted
Chapter 590, Florida Statutes, to allow claims other than gross
negligence-Forestry specifically argued that the trial court improperly
construed Section 590.125(3)(c),
Florida
StatuteS 45 Section
590.125(3)(c), Florida Statutes, provides that:
Neither a property owner nor his or her agent is liable pursuant to
s. 590.13 for damage or injury caused by the fire or resulting
smoke or considered to be in violation of subsection (2) for burns
conducted in accordance with this subsection unless gross
negligence is proven. 46
Forestry contended that Shuler's Count I (negligence) was not
actionable because this provision only subjects CPBMs to liability if
gross negligence is demonstrated. 7 In his dissenting opinion, Judge
Makar reiterated that the Legislature elevated the standard for liability in
prescribed burning cases from negli ence to gross negligence "[d]ue to
the threat of fire-related lawsuits[.]" 8 Accordingly, Forestry contended,
it was legal error for the trial court to permit Shuler to pursue and
ultimately prevail upon its count in simple negligence.4 9
Shuler's position, however, emphasized the importance of conducting
prescribed burns "in accordance with" the statute, in light of the
inherently dangerous nature of prescribed burning.50 The argument:
CPBMs who fail to comply with the statute-especially where failures to
comply with the statute could so easily devastate lives and propertyshould not benefit from so heightened a standard of liability. If a CPBM
were to conduct a prescribed burn in accordance with Section 590.125(3),
Florida Statutes, then in that case he or she would merit the protection of
the more demanding gross negligence standard under the statute.5 1On the
other hand, if a CPBM were to conduct a prescribed burn in a way that is
not in accordance with the statute, then he or she would not merit the
protection of the statute (having not acted "in accordance" with it), and
44. Id. at 920 (Makar, J., dissenting).
45. Initial Brief, supra note 1, at 11.
46.

FLA. STAT.

§

590.123(3)(c).

47. Id. at 13-18.
48. Shuler, 139 So. 3d at 916 (Makar, J., dissenting).
49. Initial Brief, supra note 1, at 13-18; see also Shuler, 139 So. 3d at 915 (Makar, J.,
dissenting) (reaching the same conclusion based upon the same authority).
50. See Madison v. Midyette, 541 So. 2d 1315, 1319 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Midyette v.
Madison, 559 So. 2d 1126, 1128 (Fla. 1990) (recognizing the same).
51. Answer Brief, supra note 7, at 16-18.

2015]

"WHEN FIRE BREAKS OUT'"

61

52
simple negligence would be enough to establish liability.
The term "prescribed burning" is defined in the statute as "the
controlled application of fire in accordance with a written prescription
for vegetative fuels under specified environmental conditions while
following appropriateprecautionarymeasures that ensure that the fire is
confined to a predeterminedarea to accomplish the planned fire or land
management objectives." 53 It "is a land management tool that benefits the
safety of the public, the environment, and the economy of the state" by,
among other things, reducing vegetative fuel load, which "reduces the
risk and severity of wildfire, thereby reducing the threat of loss of life and
and the proper
property," and by ensuring "biological diversity"
5 4 It would seem that under
management of "forestland" and "rangeland."
the statute's plain language, a certified prescribed burn should always be
controlled, conducted in accordance with a written prescription, and
"confined to a predetermined area[.]" 5
Ultimately, the trial court agreed with Shuler's interpretation of the
statute and permitted it to proceed with Count I. Moreover, although
Judge Makar concluded in his dissent that "[t]he record establishes that
for the
[Forestry] fully complied with all statutory requirements
5 6 Shuler presented
plan."
prescribed burn as outlined in the prescription
evidence at trial strongly suggesting otherwise, upon which the jury based
its determination that Forestry had indeed violated statute. 5 1 One item,
the NOV, was effectively an admission against interest by Forestry that
its own employee had violated Section 590.125, Florida Statutes, in three
ways. 58 Judge Makar made no mention of the NOV in his dissenting
opinion.
The second of Judge Makar's "three statutory interpretation" issues
was whether the trial court erred in disallowing Forestry from using the
59
statutory definition of "extinguished" in its defense. According to Judge
Makar, "[u]se of the statutory definition would have allowed [Forestry]
with
to show the certified prescribed burn was conducted in accordance
60 Forestry
so."
grossly
the statute, undercutting claims it was negligent or
argued, and Judge Makar agreed, that its admission that the Prescribed
Burn was not finally "extinguished" until May 23, 2008 was based upon
a layman 's definition of the term, not the legal one found in Section

52. Id.
53. FLA. STAT. § 590.125(1)(a) (emphasis added).
54. FLA. STAT. § 590.125(3)(a).
55. See id.
56. Shuler, 139 So. 3d at 922 (Makar, J., dissenting).
57. Answer Brief, supra note 7, at 17-18, n.8.
58. Id at 3-4.
59. Shuler, 139 So. 3d at 919 (Makar, J., dissenting); Answer Brief, supra note 7, at 22.
60. Shuler, 139 So. 3d at 924 (Makar, J., dissenting).
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590.125(1)(d), Florida Statutes (defining a certified prescribed burn as
"extinguished" once there is "no spreading flame"). 6
1 Accordingly,
Forestry contended, the trial court should have permitted them to
withdraw the admission and a pre-trial stipulation to conform them and
the evidence at trial to the legal definition of "extinguished." 62
However, Forestry could not credibly argue that it originally
understood Shuler's definition of the term "extinguished" to be a
layman's definition, and not the one in the statute. In February of
2012,
Forestry's own director, Mr. Jim Karels, testified at his deposition
concerning the definition of the word "extinguished" and ratified
Forestry's admission that the Prescribed Burn was not "extinguished," as
that term is used under the statute, until May 23, 2008.63 All depositions
and written discovery were completed by early September 2012, yeteight months later, notwithstanding Mr. Karels' earlier testimony-the
Pretrial Statement executed by Forestry on September 21, 2012 still
reflected that the Prescribed Burn was extinguished on May 23, 2008.64
Only after Shuler filed a motion in limine on September 25, 2012, which
alerted Forestry to the significance of its admission, did it file motions to
amend or withdraw the admission and stipulation (both of which were
filed in October, only weeks before trial). 5
Judge Makar also suggested that the trial court improperly rejected
Forestry's request to amend its admission and stipulation based solely on
prejudice to Shuler. 66 But Shuler argued both before the trial court and in
its answer brief that permitting Forestry to amend its answer and
admissions would have been both prejudicial and futile in light of the
unchallenged stipulation, which was obtained voluntarily and without
fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake of fact.6 7 The standards governing
the amendment of pleadings and admissions are different than those that
govern stipulations.6 8 Judge Makar did not address the issue of whether
61. Id.; Initial Brief, supra note 1, at 41-46.
62.

Initial Brief, supra note 1, at 41-46.

63. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike, Motion for Sanctions, and Response in Opposition to
Defendants' Motions for Leave to File Amended Answers to Plaintiffs Request for Admissions
and Withdraw and Amend Certain Stipulated Facts of the Pretrial Statement,
at 1063-67, Shuler,
No. 2011-66-CA (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 2012) [hereinafter Motion to Strike].
64. Id. at 1025-27.
65. Id. at 972-78; Plaintiffs motion in Limine at 975, Shuler, No. 2011-66-CA (Fla. 2d
Cir. Ct. 2012).
66. See Shuler, 139 So. 3d at 924 (Makar, J., dissenting).
67. Answer Brief, supra note 7, at 38-39.
68. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.370(b) (permitting the withdrawal or amendment of admissions
unless the party who obtained same would be prejudiced); cf LPI/Key W. Assocs.,
Ltd. v.
Beachcomber Jewelers, Inc., 77 So. 3d 852, 854-55 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (recognizing
that
stipulations are binding upon both the parties and the court, unless not voluntarily
undertaken or

if obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake of fact); Seminole Elec. Coop., Inc.
v. Dep't
of Envtl. Prot., 985 So. 2d 615, 621 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (recognizing the same).
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the trial court was bound by the stipulation in his dissenting opinion, or
how it might have affected the trial court's decision-making with respect
to the answers and admission.
Judge Makar also contended that
[b]ecause of the trial court's incorrect ruling, the jury was
erroneously told and led to believe that [Forestry] continually
violated the statute by failing to have extinguished the fire during
the forty-five day period, when in fact the certified prescribed bum
was deemed extinguished because its flames were not spreading
69
with monitoring and mopping up ongoing.
But the jury based its verdict on evidence to the contrary: in addition
70
to Mr. Karels' statement, other factual evidence and admissions on file
supported the jury's conclusion that the Prescribed Bum was not
extinguished, under any definition of the word, on each day of the
Prescribed Burn as posited by Forestry's witnesses and adopted by Judge
Makar in his dissenting opinion.7 1 The third "statutory interpretation"
issue was whether the trial court improperly precluded Forestry from
arguing. that CPBMs were not legally required to be at the Prescribed
Burn Area beyond the initial bum period. Forestry argued that the trial
court erred with respect to the meaning of "completion" in section
590.125(3)(b)1. 73 Section 590.125(3)(b)1 imposed the following
requirement on CPBMs: "Certified prescribed burning pertains only to
broadcast burning. It must be conducted in accordance with this
subsection and: 1. May be accomplished only when a certified prescribed
burn manager is present on site with a copy of the prescription from
74
ignition of the burn to its completion."
While the term "extinguished" was defined in the statute to mean that

75
"no spreading flame for . . . certified prescribed burning . . . exist[s][,]"

the term "completion" as used in section 590.125(3)(b)1 of the Florida
Statutes was not defined. Forestry argued that use of the term
"conpletion" in this context referred to completion of ignition of the
bum,76 whereas Shuler argued that it referred to completion of the
69.

Shuler, 139 So. 3d at 925 (Makar, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).

70.

See, e.g., Pretrial Statement, supra note 3, at 964 (admitting that the Prescribed Bum

caused three wildfires on April 12, May 6, and May 13, 2008).
71. Shuler, 139 So. 3d at 923-24 (Makar, J., dissenting); see Initial Brief, supra note 1, at
43; Pretrial Statement, supra note 3, at 963-65; Motion to Strike, supra note 63, at 1064.
72. Shuler, 139 So. 3d at 919-20 (Makar, J., dissenting).
73. Initial Brief, supra note 1, at 22-26.
74. FLA. STAT. § 590.125(3)(b)(1) (emphasis added).

§ 590.125(1)(d).

75.

See FLA. STAT.

76.

Initial Brief, supra note 1, at 22-26.
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prescribed burn itself.7 Forestry conceded that it did not have a CPBM
on site with a copy of the burn prescription beyond the initial two-day
period of the Prescribed Burn, which meant that it had effectively
admitted to violating the statute under Shuler's construction of the
statute.7 8 In its initial brief, Forestry acknowledged that "the
interpretation of a statute is a purely legal matter" and that the trial court
"could make a final legal determination as to what the law is[.]" 7 9
Indeed,
the trial court was entitled to decide what "completion" meant under
Section 590.125(3)(b)1, Florida Statutes, without any evidentiary input
from the parties.8 0 Nevertheless, over Shuler's objection, the trial court
held an in-chambers hearing on the interpretive dispute and received
evidence-in effect, legal opinions-from both parties.81
Forestry presented two experts with significant experience in certified
prescribed burning, Mr. Karels and Mr. Weber.8 2 Mr. Karels was also
involved with certain 1999 amendments to Chapter 590, Florida
Statutes. However, neither Mr. Karels nor Mr. Weber were lawyers or
had any experience construing statutes.8 4 On the other hand, Shuler
presented Mr. Michael Shuler, a lawyer with extensive experience
drafting and construing ordinances for Franklin County, but none specific
to prescribed burning. 8 Ultimately, the trial court construed the statute in
a way that was consistent with Shuler's interpretation.8 6
A plain reading of the statute buttressed the trial court's construction
of Section 590.125(3)(b)1, Florida Statutes. The First District Court of
Florida Indicated the "[w]hen the language of a statute is clear,
unambiguous, and conveys clear and definite meaning, there is no reason
for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction, and
the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning." 8 7 According to
the dictionary,8 8 the second definition of the word "completion" is "the
state of being completed," and the second definition of the word
"complete" is "finished; ended; concluded." Consequently, the
77. Answer Brief, supra note 7, at 18-23.
78. Shuler, 139 So. 3d at 919 (Makar, J., dissenting); Answer Brief, supra note 7, at 19;
Pretrial Statement, supra note 3, at 966.

79. Initial Brief, supra note 1, at 22 n.9, 25.
80. Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803, 807 (Fla. 2008) (recognizing that statutory
interpretation is a purely legal matter).
81.

Answer Brief, supra note 7, at 23-24.

82. Shuler, 139 So. 3d at 925-26 (Makar, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 926.
84. Answer Brief, supra note 7, at 24.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 24-25.
87. Vreuls v. Progressive Emp'r Servs., 881 So. 2d 688, 690 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).
88.

See Completion,

DICTIONARY.COM,

available at http://dictionary.reference.com/

browse/completion?s-t (last visited Oct. 30, 2014).
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Prescribed Burn could not have been "completed" any sooner than on
May 23, 2008-the same day Forestry stipulated that it was finally
"extinguished" (i.e., there was "no spreading flame." 8 9 Shuler also argued
that, taken to its logical end, Forestry's construction of the statute would
have been absurd; it would have permitted a CPBM to ignite a prescribed
because
burn, then leave and go home while the fire continues to burn,
90 The trial
accomplished.
been
completion of ignition of the burn had
court apparently found Shuler's argument persuasive.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Makar lamented that "[t]he trial court
ultimately excluded [Forestry's] experts' testimony, allowed Mr.
Shuler's testimony, and ruled consistently with [Shuler's] interpretation
of the statute." 91 He also wrote that
[t]he trial court erred in rejecting [Forestry's] interpretation of its
own statute, and allowing the jury to hear only the testimony of
Mr. Shuler... . Simply because this is a tort case does not nullify
[Forestry's] expertise on the topic nor negate deference to
[Forestry's] interpretation of a statute related to [Forestry's]
92
regulatory functions.
But these comments were misleading. First, the dissent suggested that
thejury was permitted to hear Mr. Shuler's testimony on how the statute
93
should be interpreted, but not Forestry's testimony on the same subject.
However, Mr. Shuler did not testify to the jury regarding how the statute
should be interpreted-only to the trial court, out of sight of the jury, and
at the same hearing that Forestry did.94 After the trial court ruled on the
proper construction of the statute, the trial court was entitled to preclude
evidence contrary to it (having been deemed irrelevant, in light of the trial
judge's ruling) from Forestry at trial-although it is worth noting thatthe
95
trial judge did not preclude all such evidence.
Additionally, with respect to agency deference, none of the cases
cited by Forestry or Judge Makar involved situations where the agency
in question was defending itself against a claim for damages in a civil
action.96 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that an agency should
not be afforded deference where it is defending itself in a lawsuit for
89. Answer Brief, supra note 7, at 20-21; Pretrial Statement, supranote 3, at 965.
90. Answer Brief, supra note 7, at 22-23.
91. Shuler, 139 So. 3d at 926 (Makar, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 926-27.
93. See id. at 927.
94. Answer Brief, supra note 7, at 23-24.
95. Id. at 27, 42; Transcript, supra note 9, at 857, 878-79, 907-10, 928-29, 932, 1003-05.
96. Answer Brief, supra note 7, at 28-29; Transcript, supra note 9, at 857, 878-79, 90710,928-29, 932, 1003-05.
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damages. 97

Ultimately, in light of the jury's gross negligence determination, it
was unnecessary to address Judge Makar's statutory interpretation issues.
Whether Judges Padovano and Marstiller would have agreed with Judge
Makar on one or more of them will remain the subject of speculation.
2013 AMENDMENTS
In the 2013 Florida Legislative Session, mere months after the Shuler
jury rendered its verdict, the Florida House (April 24, 2013) and Senate
(May 2, 2013) passed C.S./H.B. No. 7087, which Governor Rick Scott
approved on June 28, 2013 as Chapter 2013-226, Laws of Florida. 98
Section 25 of Chapter 2013-226 contained numerous amendments to
Section 590.125, Florida Statutes.99 Although the final bill analysis made
no mention of Shuler, many of these amendments were very likely
intended to address the statutory interpretation issues that preoccupied
the parties and the trial court during the litigation, and would later prompt
Judge Makar to write his 30-page dissenting opinion.
Section 25 of Chapter 2013-226 amended the definitions in Section
590.125, Florida Statutes, to add new definitions for "certified prescribed
burning," "contained," "gross negligence," and "smoldering." 0o All of
these definitions would have been relevant and relied upon to some
degree in the Shuler litigation. Note that the jury was instructed on two
definitions for "gross negligence," including the one added by Chapter
2013-226, but this amendment has made it the only definition now
0 Section 25
available under Chapter 590, Florida Statutes.o'
of Chapter
2013-226 also revised the definitions of "prescribed burning" and
"prescription," and replaced the definition of "extinguished" with one for
"completed," which provides that for "[b]roadcast burning, no continued
97. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988) (finding that
"[d]eference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency's convenient litigating position
would be entirely inappropriate"); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 741 (1996)
(recognizing that "[tjhe deliberateness of such positions, if not indeed their authoritativeness, is
suspect"); see also Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law,

1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 519 (1989).
98. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Agric. & Natural Res., CS/HB 7087 (2013) Staff Analysis 1
(Apr. 23, 2013).
99. See Ch. 2013-226, § 25, 2013 Fla. Laws 35-39.
100. Id.
101. Plaintiffs Amended Requested Jury Instructions and Verdict Form at 909, 1329,
Shuler, No. 2011-66-CA (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 2012). The other definition for gross negligence, which
Shuler proposed, provided: "A person may be found grossly negligent where there is a composite

of circumstances which together constitute clear and present danger, and the person is aware of

such danger, yet still undertakes a conscious, voluntary act or omission that is likely to result in
injury." Id at 925; Final Jury Instructions at 6, Shuler, No. 2011-66-CA (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 2012).

"WHEN FIRE BREAKS OUT"

2015]1

67

lateral movement of fire across the authorized area into entirely unburned
fuels within the authorized area."1 02 Recall that both of these terms were
at issue in the litigation (although "completion" was not previously
defined; this definition for "completion" is similar to the former
definition of "extinguished").
Additionally, Section 25 of Chapter 2013-226 amended the criteria
for conducting certified prescribed bums in many significant ways. It
revised Section 590.125(3)(b)l, Florida Statutes, such that CPBMs only
need to be present on-site with a copy of the prescription "until the bum
is completed [see new definition above], after which the [CPBM] is not
required to be present" (no longer "from ignition of the bum to its
completion"). With respect to written prescriptions, it now provided that
"[a] new prescription or authorization is not required for smoldering that
occurs within the authorized bum area unless new ignitions are conducted
by the [CPBM]" and "[m]onitoring the smoldering activity of a certified
prescribed bum does not require a prescription or an additional
authorization even if flames begin to spread within the authorized burn
area due to ongoing smoldering. "103
With respect to adequate firebreaks at the bum site and sufficient
personnel and firefighting equipment to contain the fire within the
authorized burn area, the statute now provided that "[fjire spreading
outside the authorized bum area on the day of the certified prescribed
burn ignition does not constitute conclusive proof of inadequate
04
firebreaks, insufficient personnel, or a lack of firefighting equipment,"
"[i]f the certified prescribed bum is contained within the authorized burn
area during the authorized period, a strong rebuttable presumption shall
exist that adequate firebreaks, sufficient personnel, and sufficient firefighting equipment were present,"' and "[c]ontinued smoldering of a
certified prescribed burn resulting in a subsequent wildfire does not by
06
itself constitute evidence of gross negligence under this section."
Section 25 of Chapter 2013-226 also revised Section 590.125(3)(c),
Florida Statutes, to protect "leaseholder[s]," "contractor[s]," and "legally
authorized designee[s]," in addition to property owners and their agents,
from liability for damage or injury caused by fire, "including the
07
reignition of a smoldering, previously contained bum."
Had all of these amendments been part of the statute in 2008, Shuler
could not have argued that Forestry violated the statute in many of the
ways that it did at trial. For example, Shuler could not have argued that
102.
103.

Ch. 2013-226, § 25, 2013 Fla. Laws at 35-39.
FLA. STAT. §§ 590.125(3)(b)(2)(a)-(b) (2007).

104.
105.
106.
107.

FLA.
FLA.
FLA.
FLA.

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

§ 590.125(3)(b)(5)(a).
§ 590.125(3)(b)(5)(b).
§ 590.125(3)(b)(5)(c).
§ 590.125(3)(c).
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Forestry violated the statute because it failed to have a CPBM on-site
from "ignition of the burn to its completion" or failed to obtain a new
prescription or authorization after the first two days of the Prescribed
Bum. 08 Given the now separate definitions of "certified prescribed
burning" and "smoldering" and associated provisions, Shuler could not
have characterized smoldering as an unauthorized continuation of the
Prescribed Burn. 109 Nor could Shuler have argued that Forestry's burn
prescription itself violated the statute because Forestry failed to include a
plan to extinguish the Prescribed Bum, because the new definition for
"prescription" does not require any such plan.'' 0
Nevertheless, Forestry still would not have escaped liability under the
statute, because the standard remains gross negligence under Section
590.125(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2013), and Shuler's expert,
Mr. Home,
testified that Forestry's conduct of the Prescribed Bum was grossly
negligent for many additional reasons beyond statutory violations, such
as failing to give greater consideration to the time of year the Prescribed
Bum was ignited; the sheer size of the Prescribed Burn; the likelihood of
losing control of the Prescribed Burn; failing to keep the Prescribed Bum
out of wetland areas, which prolonged smoldering; the inability and/or
unwillingness by Forestry to extinguish smoldering areas to the interior
of the Prescribed Burn; and permitting the Prescribed Bum to smolder for
forty-five days, cause three wildfires, and smoke out the adjacent
highway twice." "If there is [only] some evidence from which a jury
could make a finding of gross negligence, . ..

the appellate court must

affirm."" 2 Even discounting the statutory violations, it appears there was
sufficient evidence of gross negligence in this case to support the jury
verdict.'

CONCLUSION

The recent amendments to Section 590.125, Florida Statutes, were
clearly intended to make it more difficult for innocent adjacent
landowners (like the Shulers) to hold prescribed burners (primarily largescale burners like Forestry) legally accountable for their escaped
prescribed bums. By statutorily recognizing that "[c]ontinued smoldering
of a certified prescribed bum resulting in a subsequent wildfire does not
by itself constitute evidence of gross negligence under this section," and
108.

See Answer Brief, supra note 7, at 17 n.8.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See id at 12-14.
See id at 12.
Id at 17-22.
Shuler, 139 So. 3d at 915.
See id

",WHENFIRE BREAKS OUT"

2015]

69

protecting "leaseholder[s]," "contractor[s]," and "legally authorized

designee[s]," in addition to property owners and their agents, from
liability for damage or injury caused by fire, "including the reignition of
4
a smoldering, previously contained bum."ll The Legislature has further
shifted the risk of escaped prescribed bums to private individuals (and
their insurers) and away from large-scale burners like Forestry.
Instead of reexamining and improving its prescribed burning
practices in light of the Shuler litigation, Forestry has simply clarified and
codified those practices (e.g., permitting prescribed bums to smolder
indefinitely during dry times of the year) into state law, making it more
likely that they will continue-thereby maintaining or increasing the
current risk to the public. Given how rare it is (or should be) for an
inherently dangerous prescribed burn to escape its boundaries and cause
significant damage to an adjacent property-and how important
prescribed burning is to CPBMs and the State of Florida-one would
think that burners like Forestry would be more than willing to
occasionally compensate innocent adjacent landowners harmed by their
escaped prescribed burns. To the contrary, rather than making proper
1
restitution "when fire breaks out," 1s it appears that prescribed burners
will just continue to hide behind the state's certified prescribed burning
statute-come what may.

114.
115.

See §§ 590.125(3)(b)(5)(a)-(c).
See supra text accompanying note 1.
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